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ABSTRACT
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) heightened the importance of internal
controls and accordingly, a key control - the internal audit jUnction. Consequently, management
and external auditors have both increased their reliance on internal auditors' work. While there
has been considerable research regarding the impact of the underreporting of time and
premature sign-offs on the external audit, there has only been one study that has examined the
impact of these two items on the internal auditors' work. Such research is dated (1994) and
prior to the passage of sox We surveyed members of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) in
the Midwest to examine their behavior and perceptions regarding these two items. The
respondents in our study believe the underreporting of time is unethical and is supported by their
reporting of all time worked, even if such time exceeded the budget. Our findings also show that
the respondents feel premature sign-offs are unethical and result primarily from lack of
professional skepticism and inadequate training. Increasing training in audit areas and
improving communications within the audit team are possible solutions to reduce premature
sign-offs. Premature sign-offs are more likely to occur in operational audits and to a lesser
degree in financial audits and compliance audits.
Keywords: internal auditing; underreporting time; premature signoffs

INTRODUCTION

:r

he underreporting of time and premature sign-offs can negatively impact the quality of audit work by
internal auditors, which can then impact an entity's external audit. While research on these two
items has been extensive for external auditors, there has been very little research on underreporting
of time and premature sign-offs by internal auditors. We found only one study (Azad 1994) that examined these two
issues and internal auditors. Such research is dated and therefore needs to be updated. How these two issues can
impact an internal audit function is important for an entity's Board of Directors, Management, and Director of
Internal Audit to understand.
AU 322 (SAS 65) states that an auditor considers many factors in determining the nature, timing and extent
of audit procedures performed in an audit of an entity's financial statements. One of those factors is the existence of
an internal audit function. An important responsibility of the internal audit function is to monitor an entity's internal
controls, and the independent auditor has a responsibility to gain an understanding of internal controls to plan and
conduct the audit. AU 322.05 indicates that the external auditor should make inquiries of management and internal
audit personnel about the following items related to the internal audit function - organizational status, application of
professional standards, such as those developed by the Institute ofInternal Auditors, audit plan (including the nature,
timing and extent of audit work) and access to records, and whether there have been any scope limitations of their
activities. Furthermore, AU 322.06 indicates that the external auditor might inquire about the internal audit
function's charter, mission statement or similar directive from management of those charged with governance. Such
inquiry will provide information about the goals and objectives of the internal audit function. In addition to
37
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impacting the quality of the internal auditor's work and potentially the external audit, the underreporting oftime and
premature write-offs both have training and supervision implications that the Director of Internal Audit should
consider.
Two sections (Section 2330-Documenting Information and Practice Advisory 2330-1 and Section 2340Engagement Supervision and Practice Advisory 2340-1) of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IlA) International
Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing are relevant to underreporting of time and premature
sign-offs. Practice Advisory 2330-1 states that engagement working papers generally aid in the planning,
performance and review of the engagements, support the accuracy and completeness of the work performed, and
document all aspects of the engagement process, from planning to communication results. Such guidance suggests
that ALL work (hours and procedures) should be documented. Practice Advisory 2340-1 states that supervision
includes "ensuring the approved engagement program is completed unless changes are justified and authorized and
determining engagement working papers." Engagement supervision also holds the chief audit executive responsible
for developing policies and procedures designed to that all engagement working papers are reviewed to ensure they
support engagement communications and necessary audit procedures are performed. Such guidance suggests that
both the underreporting of time and premature write-offs result in inaccurate reporting and communication of audit
results.
We conducted a study that examined the underreporting of time and premature write-offs by internal
auditors. The first section of the paper summarizes relevant research that examined the underreporting of time and
premature sign-offs by internal auditors. Section two explains the design of our study and the demographic data of
the participants. Section three reports our fmdings and the final section provides concluding observations.
PRIOR RELEVANT RESEARCH

Considerable research has been done on the underreporting of time (Kelley and Margheim 1987, Otley and
Pierce 1996, Akers and Eaton 1999, 2003) and premature sign-offs (Reckers et al. 1997 Alderman and Deitrick
1982) for external audit. A recent study modeling internal auditor independence includes time pressure as a factor
based on the Azad (1994) study (Ahmad and Taylor 2009). Azad (1994) is the only research that has examined the
underreporting of time and premature sign-offs among internal auditors. He mailed a survey to members of the
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), in particular, from the Atlanta, Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, and Los Angeles
chapters. The response rate was about 41 % (262 / 638 questionnaires). He found that time budgets produced
significantly negative consequences. Internal auditors tried hard to stay under time budgets. Many internal auditors
(68.7%) worked on their own time to meet the time budget. More than 70% agreed to use their own judgment to
override some audit procedures. In addition, premature sign-offs widely existed (38%). This occurred mostly in
compliance auditing, followed by operational auditing and fmancial auditing. Internal control, inventory, and fixed
assets were most susceptible to premature sign-offs. Pressure from time budgets was identified as one top reason
that internal auditors engaged in premature sign-offs. Correspondingly, deemphasizing time budgets was one
possible way to solve the premature sign-off problem. Overall, underreporting time and premature sign-offs
appeared a prevalent and serious problem more than a decade ago.
We expect that this situation may change over time, especially after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of2002 (SOX). SOX has changed the landscape of business operation from at least two perspectives. First, Section
404 of SOX requires management and the external auditor to report on internal control on fmancial reporting. It
creates greater reliance on internal auditors and their work (Carcello et al. 2005a, Hermanson et al. 2008). This is
because the key role of internal auditors is to add value to an entity's risk management, control, and governance
processes (IIA 2010). Some evidence shows that the reliance on the internal audit function significantly increases
resources such as audit budgets, staffing levels, and their contacts with the audit committee (Carcello et al. 2005b).
Second, SOX promotes ethical behaviors to restore public confidence in the stock market. Section 406 of
SOX requires all public companies to have a written code of conduct. Following that, some stock exchanges require
that everyone in the company should be covered by the code (Verschoor 2004). The 2004 revision of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) further requires organizations of any kind to promote a cultural of ethical conduct
(Verschoor 2007). Research shows that the code of ethics emphasizes more on compliance in the post-SOX era than
38
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in the pre-SOX era (Canary and Jennings 2008). If internal auditors consider underreporting time and premature
sign-offs unethical, we expect that these issues in today's environment will not be as serious as in the past.

STUDY
Survey
We used a survey to investigate the issue of unrecorded reportable time and premature sign-offs among
internal auditors. To enhance comparability, we included many of the questions that Azad (1994) used to examine
underreporting of time and premature write-offs of audit procedures. We also included questions from prior
research (Akers and Eaton 2003) that examined the underreporting of time by external auditors. The questionnaire
was then reviewed by nine internal auditors. Based on their feedback we made minor revisions to the questionnaire.
Using SurveyMonkey.com, an introductory paragraph, which explained the study, and the revised questionnaire
were posted online. SurveyMonkey allowed the respondents to complete the survey online and also guaranteed
anonymity. Email invitations were sent to three Wisconsin chapters (Fox Valley, Madison, and Milwaukee) and
three Northern Illinois chapters (Chicago, Chicago-West, and Northwest Metro Chicago) of the Institute ofInternal
Auditors (IIA). The ftrst invitation to the survey was sent out for 15 days. The second invitation to the survey was
sent out for ten days. We received 123 responses in total out of the population of3,571 chapter members. Among
the 123 responses, 96 responses (78 percent) were received on the ftrst two days of the survey. The response rate is
low, approximately 3.4%. Based on the requests for the survey results, we infer that most of the responses came
from the three Wisconsin chapters (835 members). If this is correct, the response rate is approximately 14.7%.
Demographic Data
Table 1 presents the demographic data that we collected about the respondent's organization (public,
private, not-for-proftt, and size of internal audit department) and the respondent (gender, professional certiftcations,
experience-internal and public, position). Our respondents are from different types of organizations as
approximately 43.1 % are with publicly traded companies, followed by 35.0% from privately held companies,
12.2% from non-for-proftt organizations, and the remaining 9.8% from government agencies. While the size ofthe
internal audit department varies from 1-5 employees to more than 50 employees, most (92.6%) of the respondents
are with departments of30 or fewer employees. Only 7.4% report a department size greater than 30 employees.
More than half (54.1 %) of our respondents are female which is higher than Azad's (1994-28.7%) results.
Considering the increase in female accounting majors during the past 15 years we aren't surprised that the
percentage of female respondents is higher than the Azad study. It is, however, interesting that the majority of the
respondents are female when considering the positions of the respondents. Approximately 43% are either the
Director of internal audit (19.7%) or an Audit Manager (23%) while slightly more than half (52%) of the
respondents are an Audit Senior/Supervisor (27%) or Staff Auditor (25.4%). The majority (70.7%) of our
respondents have some type of professional certiftcation with the CPA (51.2%) most frequently cited followed by
the CIA (23.6%). And thirty-ftve respondents (28.5%) have two or more professional certiftcations. More than
60% of respondents have more than ftve years of internal audit experience and only 3.3 % of them have less than one
year of experience. While a lot of the respondents have public accounting experience it is interesting to note that
45.5% ofthem have no experience in public accounting at all.

RESULTS
Underreporting of Time: Ethical Implications
The second section of our survey is on time budgets and inaccurate reporting of time. These questions
focus on the control mechanism, reporting time, the use of time budgets on performance evaluation, the current
preparation of time budget, internal auditors' attitude to time reporting, and actions they may take under time
pressure. The results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 provides our [mdings regarding organizational issues
related to time reporting - the existence of organizational policy on time reporting, supervisor's request to
underreport time, respondent's unrecorded reportable time during the prior year and the organizational level that
39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Review of Business Information Systems - Fourth Quarter 2010

Volume 14, Number 4

reviews time reports for performance evaluation. Table 3 shows the respondents' perceptions regarding the
underreporting of time and impact of time budgets on internal auditors' behavior.
Underreporting of Time: Organizational Issues Related to Time Reporting
As reported in Table 2, 41 % of respondents report that their organization has a policy regarding accurate
time reporting. However, among those with a policy, only 40% have some sanctions for violating the policy.
Sanctions identified by the respondents include: verbal warning, warning/discussion with management, disciplinary
action, and termination. The following responses are particularly interesting: "Falsification of records (including
time records) is considered 'misconduct in public office' (a felony);" and "Our department does not track audit
hours or time budgets. Generally, we conduct tailored/scoped audits that are assigned deadlines for reporting. So
we manage by audit deadline, as opposed to hourly reporting." Although the development of a policy regarding
accurate time reporting and the use of sanctions are not widely adopted by the respondents' organizations, 73.6 % of
the respondents report that the reporting of time is reviewed for performance evaluation. Twenty-eight percent
report that the reporting of time is reviewed by two or more levels.
Supervisors may put pressure on internal auditors to underreport time as in external audit (Akers and Eaton
2003). Our fmdings suggest that this isn't an issue for the respondents. None of the respondents note that
supervisors, male or female, requested them, either explicitly or implicitly, to frequently underreport time. Only
2% (requested by female supervisor) and 3% (requested by male supervisor) of the respondents are explicitly
requested to occasionally underreport time, and 5% (requested by female supervisor) and 7% (requested by male
supervisor) are implicitly requested to underreport time. Despite the lack of pressure from supervisors, 23.3% (21 of
the 90 that responded to this question) of the respondents state that they underreported time during the past year.
While the range ofunderreported time is 1% to 30%, the average underreported time is 6.8%.
Perceptions Regarding the Underreporting of Time and Impact of Budgets on Auditor Behavior
In Table 3, responses to our questions are grouped by opinion, from strongly disagree, disagree, indifferent,
agree, to strongly agree. We report the results in percentages based on the actual number of responses to the
question. We also assign values one to five with one representing "strongly disagree" and five representing
"strongly agree." Using a mean value above 3.50 and below 2.50 as an indication of agreement or disagreement,
there are only three questions in Table 3 (questions 13, 16 and 23) that fall in this range and one other question that
is close (question 17, mean = 3.45). While these findings suggest that the respondents are indifferent to the issues,
an examination of the responses for each question shows a lack of consensus by the respondents for most of the
items. For many of the questions, the percentage of respondents that agree approximates the percentage of
respondents that disagree.
Accordingly, we draw the following four observations. First, while approximately 7% disagree and 9% are
indifferent, there is overall support that underreporting of time is unethical (mean = 4.08). This provides some
evidence that in the post-SOx era awareness of ethical behavior is high. Second, there is moderate support (mean
=3.81) that the time budget is a necessary tool for the evaluation of an internal audit department. This fmding
suggests that time budgets aren't a major component in evaluating the performance of an internal audit department.
Third, while there is only slightly moderate support (mean of 3.45), the majority of the respondents (approximately
65%) indicate that attainment of the time budget is a factor in the auditor's performance evaluation. Fourth, most
(77.l %) of the respondents indicate that during the past 12 months, if they worked more than the budgeted hours,
they reported the additional hours worked. This finding is consistent with the result that most respondents consider
underreporting of time unethical.
Premature Sign-offs: Ethical Implications
In this study, a premature signoffis defined as signing off the required audit step(s) without completing the
work or not noting the omission of the work and these steps are not covered by other audit procedures. A premature
signoff affects the quality of an internal audit and can also impact an external audit if the external auditor relies upon
the work of the internal audit department. Our fmdings on premature signoffs are reported in Table 4. Most (87.5%
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either agree or strongly agree and mean = 4.17) of the respondents perceive that premature sign-offs are unethical
while 3.3% either disagree or strongly disagree. This finding is consistent with the fmding that only three
respondents (2.5%) admit that they signed off audit steps without completing or noting the omission of some audit
procedures in the past 12 months and that few respondents (18.5%) are aware that premature signoffs occur in their
department (mean = 2.37). Consistent with these findings, the majority of the respondents (75.2%) either disagree
or strongly disagree (mean = 2.31) that the auditor's professional judgment is sufficient to override the performance
of a specific audit step, while the majority (81.8%) either agree or strongly agree (mean = 3.93) that an auditor
should never omit a planned procedure without consulting a supervisor.
Reasons for Premature Sign-offs
Regarding the reasons why premature signoffs occur (question 32) our fmdings show moderate support for
the following six reasons: (1) inclination to readily accept operating personnel explanation (mean = 3.70), (2) an
audit step appearing unnecessary or immaterial (mean = 3.68), (3) inadequate supervision (mean = 3.52), (4) lack of
communication with supervisors (mean = 3.46), (5) lack of specific technical knowledge (mean = 3.45), and (6) time
budget constraint (mean = 3.39). Azad (1994) found four primary reasons for premature signoffs: (1) an audit step
appearing unnecessary or immaterial (mean = 3.69), (2) inadequate supervision (mean = 3.61), (3) inclination to
readily accept operating personnel explanation (mean = 3.62), and (4) time budget constraint (mean = 3.61). While
the rank order of the reasons differs, our findings are similar to Azad's (1994) fmdings with two exceptions communication and technical knowledge. Having technical knowledge is critical to produce quality audit work. The
prior literature finds that without specific technical standards, the external auditor is less likely to be supported by
the audit committee in an audit dispute and management tends to obtain outcomes in its favor (Knapp 1987). Our
result suggests that without the appropriate technical knowledge, internal auditors tend to prematurely sign off audit
procedures, which adversely affects audit quality. Our study incorporated the communication question as a result of
pretesting while the Azad (1994) study didn't use a communication question.
Procedures to Reduce Premature Sign-offs
Our fmdings identify four ways to reduce premature sign-offs: (1) improved communication within the
audit team (mean = 3.96), (2) training of auditable area (mean = 3.82), (3) de-emphasis of the time budget (mean =
3.69), and (4) tighter supervision of inexperienced auditors (mean =3.58). Azad's top four solutions included
improved communication within the audit team (mean = 4.12), tighter supervision of staff with less than two years'
experience (mean = 3.63), increased variety of work assignments (mean = 3.57), and (4) de-emphasis of the time
budget (mean = 3.54). The fmdings of the two studies are once again very similar. Both studies find
communication between auditors, supervision of inexperienced auditors and de-emphasis of the time budget as ways
to reduce premature signoffs. Our study found training, a variable not used by Azad (1994), to be more important
than variety of work assignment. The four methods identified above by our respondents are all stronger than the
review process (question 31) where 60.5% (mean = 3.44) believe that the review procedures in their department are
adequate to detect premature sign-offs.
Types of Audits and Premature Sign-offs
The majority of our respondents (57.4% either agree or strongly agree) state that operational auditing is the
type of audit most likely to have premature sign-offs (mean = 3.48), followed by fmancial auditing (mean = 3.20),
and fmally compliance auditing (mean = 3.06). Azad's (1994) fmdings are similar to ours with respect to
operational auditing and financial auditing but there is a difference with respect to compliance auditing. Our results
show a lower likelihood of premature sign-offs for compliance auditing than did Azad (1994), which is consistent
with what Hespenheide (2006) observes that internal auditors shift their effort to SOX compliance. While the Azad
(1994) study asked respondents to indicate what phase of the audit where premature sign-offs were likely to occur
by using the following categories (internal controls, cash, receivables, inventory counts, other inventory work, fixed
assets, payroll, accounts payable, debt, owner's equity, and revenue recognition), we used an open-ended question.
The majority of our responses are categorized succinctly as follows: planning, gathering evidence, testing,
execution, and fieldwork review. Below are more detailed comments that provide additional insights into our
findings:
41
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Fieldwork in Operational audits that do not have traditionally defined work programs.
Operational auditing since our current focus is SOX and Compliance auditing.
Our audit approach requires professional judgment, risk analysis, and scoping. All Scoping decisions are to be
documented. The problem with this approach is that we haven't developed the competencies in our staff to
determine what is critical and what is not. Given our tight time-budgets, something "has to give", but our staff have
difficulty determining what's critical and what's not As a result, they work OT or sign-off despite "rounding some
corners ", so to speak (ie accepting inquiry wlo corroboration). This (is) a short-coming of our management and
training. Experienced auditors should be adequately trained and empowered to "shift on the fly n. New staff should
be monitored more closely.
These comments are consistent with our fmding that one way to reduce premature sign-offs is through
better training. Operational audits, which focus on the efficient and effective use of resources, often use audit
procedures that vary from procedures used in fmancial type audits or specific procedures used in a compliance audit.
Considering the time and effort devoted to SOX by public companies and many private companies that implemented
SOX although not required to do so, we aren't surprised that our findings showed less of a likelihood of premature
sign-offs for financial and compliance audits as compared to operational audits.
CONCLUSIONS
Unlike public accounting firms, the majority of our respondents work for organizations that do NOT have
policies regarding the underreporting of time. Although many of our fmdings regarding the underreporting of time
suggest that the participants are indifferent, a close examination shows differing viewpoints. The participants
believe underreporting of time is unethical and there is agreement that the respondents would report the time worked
(question 25 a, Table 3), even if such time exceeded the budget. A small percentage of the respondents were asked
by supervisors, female or male, explicitly or implicitly, to underreport time. Yet, internal auditors continue to
underreport time (average time underreported was 6.8%). Our fmdings also indicate that, while time budgets have
become tighter in the past six years, the participants are indifferent that the time budget interferes with proper
conduct of the audit. These findings are consistent with our expectation that underreporting time is a less severe
problem post-SOX. Azad (1994) also found that time budgets were tightening; however, he found that the time
budget did interfere with proper conduct of the audit. We found moderate support that the time budget is a
necessary tool for evaluating the internal audit department as well as the performance of the internal auditor.
Regarding premature sign-offs, the respondents believe that such behavior is unethical, as evidenced by the
very small percentage that reported doing so within the past twelve months. Other findings relate to training and the
planning and conduct of the audit. The respondents don't believe that an auditor should omit a procedure without
consulting a supervisor which pertains to communication within the audit team. Premature sign-offs result primarily
from willingness to accept explanations by operating personnel, which suggests a lack of professional skepticism,
inadequate supervision, perception of unnecessary audit step, lack of communication with supervisors, and lack of
technical knowledge. With the exception of technical knowledge, our findings are consistent with Azad's findings.
The respondents felt premature sign-offs could be addressed by better communication within the audit team, training
of the audit area, de-emphasis of the time budget, and tighter supervision of younger staff (two years or less). Azad
(1994) also identified better communication as the primary way of reducing premature sign-offs.
Our fmdings show that premature sign-offs are more likely to occur in operational audits and, to a lesser
degree, fmancial audits and compliance audits while Azad found that premature sign-offs were more likely to occur
in compliance and operational auditing, and to a much lesser degree, in financial audits. We believe our fmding, in
comparison to Azad's results, indicates that SOX testing by internal auditors has reduced the likelihood of premature
sign-offs during compliance audits.
This study makes three primary contributions to the existing literature. First, it provides current evidence
regarding two dysfunctional behaviors of internal auditors - underreporting of time and premature sign-offs.
Second, this study adds to the internal audit literature as only one study has examined these issues and that study,
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which was conducted in 1994, is now dated. Third, this study extends the prior research by examining whether
organizations have a policy on underreporting of time, requests by supervisors by gender, and using an open-ended
question to determine why premature sign-offs might occur in compliance, financial and operational audits.
This study is subject to some limitations. First, although we have no reason to believe otherwise, internal
auditors in Illinois and Wisconsin might not be representative of all internal auditors. Second, there are inherent
limitations associated with the use of a survey instrument. For example, there is a potential for non-response bias or
bias in the reporting of the data since underreporting time and premature sign-offs are sensitive subjects. Reckers et
al. (1997) finds that using the direct method eliciting responses to sensitive issues, such as premature sign-offs,
generates a lower level of reporting than using a randomized response approach. The incidence of underreporting
time and premature sign-offs may be higher than what is reported in this study.
Based on our [mdings, future research should examine whether time budgets are used by internal audit
departments and the reasons why. Regarding premature sign-offs, future research should examine what internal
audit departments are doing to improve training for auditors and communication within the audit team and examine
more closely how to reduce premature sign-offs in operational audits.
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Response Percent
1I

2

3

4

5
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7

Business type
Publicly held
Privately held
Non-for-profit
Government

43.1%
35.0%
12.2%
9.8%

Gender:
Gender:
Female
Male

54.1%
45
45.9%
.9%

Professional certification status (choose all applicable)
CIA
CPA
CFE
CISA
CMA
None

23
.6%
23.6%
51.2%
4.9%
15.4%
3.3%
29.3%

Respondents' years of internal audit experience
Less than one year
More than one year but less than three years
~ears but less than five years
More than three years
More than five years

3.3%
19.5%
17.1%
60.2%

Respondents' position title:
Director of internal audit department
Audit manager
Audit senior/supervisor or equivalent
Audit staff or equivalent
Other:
Other:

19.7%
23.0%
27.0%
25.4%
4.9%

Size of your internal audit department:
1-5
\-5 employees
5-10 employees
10-30 employees
30-50 employees
more than 50 employees

30.3%
25.4%
36.9%
2.5%
4.9%

Respondents' years of public accounting experience:
None
Less than one year
More than one year but less than three years
More than three years but less
Jess than five years
More than five years

45.5%
5.7%
13.0%
16.3%
19.5%
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Table
2:: 0Or2anizational
Related
Time
Reporting
T a bl e 2
ssues R
Ime R
Does your organization have a policy regarding accurate time reporting?
41.0%
Yes
59.0%
No
If yes, what are the sanctions for violating the policy?
How often does your supervisor request you to underreport time?

EXPLICIT requests by FEMALE supervisor
EXPLICIT requests by MALE supervisor
10

Yes,
frequently
0
0

Yes,
occasionally
2%
3%

No, never

Yes,
frequently
0
0

Yes,
occasionally
5%
7%

No, never

98%
97%

How often does your supervisor request you to underreport time?

IMPLICIT requests by FEMALE supervisor
sup_ervisor
IMPLICIT requests by MALE supervisor
11
II

In the preceding year, what percentage of your total work was unrecorded reportable time?
time: the average is 6.8 %
21 out of 90 respondents underreport time:

12

Which level reviews the reportinK
reporting of time forperfonnance
for performance evaluation (check all
None
Director of internal audit department
Audit manager
Audit senior/supervisor or equivalent
Audit staff or equivalent
Audit committee
CEO
CFO

applicable)?
26.4%
44.6%
39.7%
10.7%
2.5%
5.0%
3.3%
9.9%
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14
15
IS

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23
24
25

26
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.'
d't
mg th
erceptlOns Regar d'109
errepo rfmgo0 fT'Imean dI mpact
mpac t 0 fB U d1gets
T a bl e 3 : PerceptJOns
t he Un derreportmg
Igets on A U d'
lor
Itor B eh aVJOr
aVlOr
Strongly Disagree Indifferent Agree Strongly Mean Standard
disae;ree
disagree
agree
Deviation
ae;ree
9.0%
4.08
Underreporting time is unethical
3.3%
48.4% 35.2%
0.95
4.1%
The time budget interferes with the proper
7.4%
21.5%
32.2%
3.06
1.14
29.8%
9.1%
conduct of an audit
3.31
The time budget has a significant influence
17.6%
1.10
4.2%
25.2%
41.2% 11 .8%
on the auditor's
job performance
auditor'siob
13.2%
The time budget is a necessary management
5.8%
3.50
14.0%
1.03
57.9%
9.1%
tool for the evaluation of an internal audit
department
15.6%
Time budget attainment is a factor in the
5.7%
13.9%
59.0%
5.7%
3.45
1.00
performance evaluation process of the
internal auditor
3.27
13.3%
When the time budget is exceeded in a
3.3%
28.3%
48.3%
6.7%
48 .3%
1.05
project of an audit, the internal auditor feels
a need to save time elsewhere
1.21
12.3%
5.7%
There is a natural conflict between the
26.2%
37.7% 18.0%
3.36
concept of a time budget and the gathering
of sufficient competent
com£etent evidential matter
3.23
1.24
Internal audit personnel sometimes take
8.3%
10.7%
38.0% 14.9%
28.1%
work home and don't report the time so as
to meet the time budget
Time budgets are prepared by the total
4.1%
1.12
12.4%
42.1%
3.22
31.4%
9.9%
amount of hours for the audit, not by
components of the audit
Time budgets are prepared for each
5.0%
35.0%
2.98
1.11
13.3%
40.0%
6.7%
component of the audit
Time budgets have become tighter in the
1.7%
22.5%
45.8% 15.0%
3.58
0.98
15.0%
IIpast 6 years
Pressure from time budgets leads to internal
8.3%
25.6%
24.8%
2.89
1.10
33.9%
7.4%
audit staff and senior turnover
In performing my work within the last 12
months, which of the following actions
would I have been more likely to take in
response to time budget pressures
14.4%
a) Perform task assignments and report
2.5%
3.81
0.85
62.7% 14.4%
5.9%
time worked over the budget
12.8%
2.74
1.06
30.8%
2.6%
7.7%
46.2%
b) Cut down on some follow-up-procedures
c) Perform task assignments on my
14.3%
14.3%
27.7%
2.76
1.20
37.0%
6.7%
personal time and do not report that time
d) Employ my judgment to overrule some
9.3%
14.4%
36.4%
2.91
1.12
35.6%
4.2%
audit procedures
Meeting time budgets contributes to a high
5.1%
28.8%
3.19
1.02
22.0%
37.3%
6.8%
overall performance evaluation
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27
28

29

30

31
32

33

34

35

Premature sign-off is unethical
The auditor's professional judgment is
always sufficient to overrule
ovenule the
performance of a specific audit step
lJJ.erformance
i.1'.erfonnance
The person performing
perfonning an audit procedure
should never omit a planned procedure
without consulting a supervisor
I am aware that some auditors in my
department sign off required audit steps,
not covered by other audit steps, without
completing the work or noting the
omission of procedures
Review procedures in my department are
adequate to detect premature sign-offs
In my opinion, premature sign-offs are the
result of (please respond to every item):
a) An audit step appearing unnecessary or
immaterial
b) Dislike for the specific work required
c) Time budget constraint
d)
d}
d)_ Inadequate supervision
e) Misunderstanding of professional
responsibilities
f) Lack of specific technical knowledge
g) Desire to obtain a favorable
performance evaluation
h) Inclinations to readily accept operating
personnel explanation as sufficient
competent evidential matter
i) Lack of communication with
supervisors
In my opinion, premature sign-offs could
be reduced by (please respond to every
item):
a) Tighter supervision of staff (Jess
(less than
two years
years'' experience)
b) Tighter supervision of all internal
auditors
c) Greater allowance for professional
judgment at all levels
d) Greater allowance for professional
iudgment at staff levels
judgment
e) De-emphasis of the time budget
f) Increased variety of work assignments
_f)
g) Improved communication within the
audit team
h) Training of auditable area
i) The use of electronic work paper tools
In my opinion, premature sign-offs
generally are likely to occur in (please
respond to every item):
item):
Financial auditing
Operational auditing
Compliance auditing
During the past 12 months, I signed off
audit steps without completing the work or
noting the omission of the procedure(
procedure(s)
s)

Table
Premature
Signoffs
T
a ble 44:: P
remature s·
12no s
Strongly
Disagree
Indifferent
disagree
2.5%
9.2%
0.8%
66.9%
8.3%
10.7%

Agree

Mean

54.2%
13.2%

Strongly
agree
33.3%
0.8%

6.6%

56.2%

25.6%

3.93

4.17
2.31

Standard
Deviation
0.76
0 .76
0 .84

2.5%
2 .5%

9.1%

19.3%

47.1%

15.1%

14.3%

4.2%

2.37

1.08

3.4%

20.2%

16.0%

50.4%

10.1%

3.44

1.03

1.7%

6.7%

18.3%

68.3%

5.0%

3.68

0.74

0.8%
1.7%
0.0%
2.5%

35.0%
23.5%
17.4%
23.5%

23.3%
16.0%
23 .1%
23.1%
19.3%

38.3%
51.3%
49.6%
47.9%

2.5%
7.6%
9.9%
6.7%

3.07
3.39
3.52
3.33

0.93
0.98
0.90
0.99

1.7%
4.1%

19.2%
37.2%

17.5%
24.8%

55.8%
28.1%

5.8%
5.8%

3.45
2.94

0.92
0 .92
1.03

0.0%

12.5%

17.5%

57.5%

12.5%

3.70

0.85

0.0%

20.2%

20.2%

52.9%

6.7%

3.46

0.89

1.6%

14.8%

16.4%

58.2%

9.0%

3.58

0.91
0.91

3.3%

18.0%

26.2%

49.2%

3.3%

3.31

00.92
.92

1.7%

33.3%

24.2%

35.8%

5.0%

3.09

0.98

4.1%

37.2%

23.1%
23 .1%

32.2%

3.3%

2.93

1.00

0.8%
1.7%
0.8%

10.7%
19.2%
4.1%

24.0%
30.0%
9.9%

47.9%
40.8%
68.6%
68
.6%

16.5%
8.3%
16.5%

3.69
3.35
3.96

0.90
0.94
00.71
.71

0.8%
1.7%

5.0%
18.2%

15.7%
31.4%

68.6%
39.7%

9.9%
9.1%

3.82
3.36

00.71
.71
0.94

2.5%
1.6%
3.3%
Yes
2.5%

22.3%
11.5%
28.1%
No
97.5%

32.2%
29.5%
30.6%

38.8%
52.5%
35.5%

4.1%
4.9%
2.5%

3.20
3.48
3.06

0.92
0 .92
0.83
0.93
0 .93

0.Q3
0.03
0.D3

0.16
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